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Introduction
“Dilde, fikirde, işte birlik.”
(Unity in language, thought and action.)
- Ismail Gasprinsky, quoted in TÜRKSOY’s brochure.
When I first came across an organization called TÜRKSOY (short for the International
Organization of Turkic Culture), I fully expected that I had discovered the present-day
incarnation of Pan-Turkism – the ideology that Turkic peoples from the Balkans to Siberia
should unite under the banner of a common ethnicity. After all, the organization’s acronym
literally signified ‘Turkic race’ in Turkish.1 Several months later, as I sat in the office of Dr. Firat
Purtas, assistant director of TÜRKSOY, I was genuinely surprised as he told me not only that
TÜRKSOY wholly opposed the notion of Pan-Turkism, but that the organization did not
consider itself ‘ethnically motivated.’ With great caution, he warned me that TÜRKSOY was not
a racist organization, but rather believed in the ‘universal’ quality of Turkic culture. Hoping to
probe the ideology of the organization, I asked what exactly constituted Turkic culture. He
hesitantly replied that he supposed anything within the bounds of the Turkic-speaking world
could be considered as Turkic culture.2
Dr. Purtas’s conception of Turkic culture and the organization’s mandate both paralleled
and diverged in different dimensions from historic project of Pan-Turkism. As the first modern
articulation of Turkic identity, the movement had its origins in the mid-19th century among the
Tatars of the Russian Empire who sought an avenue of international solidarity and a means to
resist increasing Russification. The notion of Pan-Turkism, or the political unification of all
1

Türk is conventionally used to designate both ‘Turkish’ and ‘Turkic’ in the Turkish language.
The former primarily indicates a citizen of the Republic of Turkey, whereas the latter refers to a
vast array of peoples belonging to the same linguistic family. While in the meaning of Türk can
be ambiguous between the two, I have translated it as ‘Turkic’ in all situations that do not
explicitly reference citizens of Turkey.
2
Author’s interview with Firat Purtas, January 8, 2013.
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Turkic-speaking peoples under the banner of shared ethnicity soon took root in the Ottoman
Empire, and a number of prominent intellectuals advocated for Pan-Turkism as imperial policy.
Since Turkic peoples did not (and still do not) form a contiguous geographic population, another
means for unification identified in linguistic commonality. Ismail Gasprinsky, a Crimean Tatar,
played a significant role in fostering a common Turkic language through his publication
Tercüman that also advocated for Turkic political unity within the context of nationalism.3 PanTurkism’s most prominent advocate came to be the Ottoman Turkish intellectual and poet Ziya
Gökalp who called for a Turkic homeland not within Turkey, nor the Central Asia region of
Turkestan, but within “the fatherland… a large and eternal country – Turan!”4 Grounded in
notions of a shared language above all, Pan-Turkism was conceived as a fundamentally cultural
mandate that transcended (yet overlapped considerably with) religion.
As the self-proclaimed UNESCO of the Turkic world, TÜRKSOY advocates a
linguistically based and culturally focused conception of Turkic identity, similarly to PanTurkism. The organization differs considerably, however, on the level of politics. Pan-Turkism
irrevocably constituted an irredentist ideology historically directed at Russia. In the 19th century,
irredentist attitudes called for the liberation of the Turkic subjects of the Russian Empire in
Central Asia, the Volga region, the Crimea and the Caucasus. During the Soviet era, similar calls
were by Pan-Turkists within Turkey, although Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s enduring nationalist
ideology limited the mandate of the Turkish state to its borders within Anatolia.5 The so-called
“outside Turks” (dış Türkleri) were culturally and linguistically severed from the Turks of
Turkey until the fall of the Soviet Union. In the years following the independence of the five
3

Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: from Irredentism to Cooperation (Indiana University Press,
1995), p.1-15
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Ibid, p.37
5
Ibid, p.94
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Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia, TÜRKSOY was founded between the six
Ministers of Culture as a diplomatic forum for cultural rapprochement. The Pan-Turkist Project
turned from irridentism to national cooperation, as the nationalist consolidation of the 20th
century both inside and outside of the Soviet Union proved to be the ultimate obstacle to the PanTurkist dream.6
In many ways, TÜRKSOY lives in the shadow of Pan-Turkism as both a cultural and
political phenomenon. Much of the history of Turkic thought and culture remains inseparable
from the Pan-Turkist mission. At the same time, the political threat of Pan-Turkism looms over
the project of TÜRKSOY as the specter of history: dependent on good relations with Russia, the
organization has consequently sought to actively distance itself from (in Dr. Purtas’s words) the
“racist” ideas of Pan-Turkism. In 2008, a smear campaign was launched in the Russian press
proclaiming TÜRKSOY the reincarnation of political Pan-Turkism.7 In order to escape the
irredentist and “racist” connotations of Pan-Turkism (which still constitutes the historical
reference point for the formulation of a Turkic identity), TÜRKSOY has sought refuge and
legitimation in the notion of universal culture. By forging alliances with UNESCO and modeling
their activities on the organization’s universalist understanding of culture, TÜRKSOY seeks to
foster a model of “cultural diplomacy.”8 Moreover, while political Pan-Turkism advocated
international conflict through ethnic irredentism, both TÜRKSOY and UNESCO view culture as

6
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the key to “international solidarity, peace and equality.”9 In this rhetoric, politics and culture are
cast as fundamentally opposed categories, divorced from one another.
Contrary to TÜRKSOY’s proposition that culture stands independently of political
agendas, this paper will aim to describe the ways in which TÜRKSOY’s activities are thoroughly
intermeshed within the realm of the political. At the center of this project stands the argument
that the act of claiming culture as depoliticized – whether as an organic, politically neutral
phenomenon or as a pre-political fact – remains profoundly political. In the context of
TÜRKSOY, the disavowal of politicized culture is couched in the organization’s appeal to the
universal ideals of cultural exchange and world peace. At the same time, the organization can
only claim to aspire to universal culture within the limits of “the Turkic world” – consequently,
the project of TÜRKSOY is that of a regional UNESCO; a culturally specific instantiation of
universal values. This paper will serve the dual objectives of revealing the means by which
TÜRKSOY claims to divorce culture from politics, while at the same time exploring the
peculiarities of a localized UNESCO at the service of Turkic ideals. My contention is that rather
than reenacting the ideal of a unified Turkic nation, TÜRKSOY acts in the service of a national
coalition of the political interests of its member states. Furthermore, the organization plays an
important political role in the symbolic ratification of national culture by conferring upon it the
appearance of the primordial – an intrinsic cultural feature that both predates and constitutes the
premise of national consciousness.
While a comprehensive overview of the organization’s massive scope of cultural
activities, I have sought to highlight three important instances of TÜRKSOY’s politics across
three chapters. The first chapter will provide a brief history of the organization and discuss the
9

Bjarke Nielsen, “UNESCO and the ‘right’ kind of culture; Bureaucratic production and
articulation.” Critique of Anthropology 31.4 (2011), p.274.
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important role of cultural form in the development of TÜRKSOY’s ideology. The second chapter
will discuss the rise of Nevruz as the organization’s trademark event. Nevruz has been pioneered
to international audiences as the Turkic world’s contribution to universal culture, yet the holiday
has also been monopolized by TÜRKSOY’s constituent countries to assert the entitlement of
titular ethnicities at the exclusion of ethnic and cultural minorities. The third and last chapter will
deal with how TÜRKSOY’s model of the Cultural Capital of the Turkic World, first held in
Astana in 2012, has become complicit in Kazakhstan’s nation-building process. As a counterweight to Kazakhstan’s aim of achieving global modernity, TÜRKSOY’s activities marked
Kazakhstan as culturally particular. This claim to primordial Kazakh culture both lends
legitimacy to President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s authoritarian vision of a particular “Kazakhstani
way,” while ratifying his notion of national culture as organic and inherently pre-political.

Chapter 1
A Brief History of TÜRKSOY Across Cultural Forms
The collapse of the Soviet Union marked a watershed in Turkish foreign policy. While
Turkey’s importance to Western powers as a member of NATO diminished, the newly
independent states of the Caucasus and Central Asia offered the promise of new regional
alliances. Turkey’s immediate response to the emergence of six predominantly Muslim republics
in the Caucasus and Central Asia, five of which comprised an ethnically Turkic titular majority,
was marked by an extraordinary tone of fraternity. Couched in an almost spiritual rhetoric,
Turkish politicians expressed an innate connection between Turkey and the Turkic nations of the
Caucasus and Central Asia. On an official visit in Kazakhstan in 1993, Turkish President Turgut
Özal pronounced, “Anatolia is the motherland for us, while Kazakhstan is the land of our

6

ancestors.” 10 A year later, former Prime Minister and then President Süleyman Demirel
maintained that Turkey had inescapable “moral responsibilities” rooted in Turkey’s shared
history with the ex-Soviet Turkic republics. 11 This notion of an intrinsically common Turkic
culture and history between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and
Kazakhstan paved the way for the institutionalization of TÜRKSOY.

TÜRKSOY’s Founding and the Bülbüloğlu Years
Founded in 1993 as the Joint Administration of Turkic Arts and Culture (Türk Kültür ve
Sanatları Ortak Yönetimi, abbreviated as the acronym TÜRKSOY), the organization comprised
the Ministers of Culture of the six Turkic republics. The name of the organization itself was an
overt reference to the idea of common ethnic origins: the Turkish words Türk and soy meaning
‘Turkic race’ or ‘Turkic ethnicitiy.’ The initial scope of activities was mostly limited to formal
diplomatic activities. Under the leadership of the Azerbaijani Minister of Culture Polad
Bülbüloğlu, the TÜRKSOY of the 1990s had a relatively limited scope of activities. The
organization served primarily as a forum for the Ministers of Culture to establish diplomatic ties.
In TÜRKSOY’s first serial publication in 2000, Bülbüloğlu cited the fourteen summits, or
biannual meetings of the Ministers of Culture of the organization’s constituent nations as the
main index of the organization’s success. Apart from the maintenance of diplomatic relations in
the realm of culture, Bülbüloğlu highlighted the organization’s publication of fifteen books as
another major achievement.12
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Bülbüloğlu’s tenure as director of TÜRKSOY from 1993 to 2007 can be summarized as a
period of internal rapprochement among member states. This rapprochement was presented as a
means to rectify the divide that the Soviet period had imposed on the Turkic world. Within the
rhetoric of the organization, the bridging of the historical divide between Turkey and the exSoviet Turkic republics was also cast as a spiritual endeavor. More than freedom from the Soviet
state’s atheist policy, the notion of ‘spirital awakening’ extended into the national realms of
history, culture and language as well as religion.13 This ‘spiritual awakening’ across the
Caucasus and Central Asia paralleled the search for national identity.14 A shared conception of
common ‘spiritual’ values underscored the nascent cultural diplomacy of the six founding
member states. In 1998, the status of observer member was extended to the autonomous
Republics of Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Yakut, Hakassia, Altai and Tuva of the Russian
Federation, as well as to the independent Gagauz region of Moldova and to Northern Cyprus.
The addition of these observer states effectively brought Russia into the organization’s project,
and the attendance of Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev at the 10th anniversary
celebration of TÜRKSOY evidenced Russian support of TÜRKSOY’s mandate.15
TÜRKSOY’s early emphasis on diplomatic relations was mirrored by the organization’s
scope of cultural activities. The proliferation of academic publications evidenced a more
sophisticated approach to Turkic culture that served two purposes. The first was to catalog, as it
were, major figures, works and monuments in the domain of Turkic culture. This took place
across a number of literary and ethnographic academic publications, focusing on topics such as
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Bashkurt and Hakas folk legends, poetry anthologies and biographies of important literary
figures. [ MORE DETAIL? ] These studies served to “reacquaint” Turks in Turkey with the
culture of the Caucasus, and Central Asia in particular.16 As a second objective, a number of
publications sought to highlight common elements of Turkic culture. Most notable among these
was an ambitious book titled Shared Motifs of the Turkic World from the Altai Mountains to the
Danube (1995), but there were also other titles such as A Poetry Anthology of the Turkic World
(2000) and Architectural Monuments of the Turkic Republics (1996). The latter publications
aimed at legitimating claims to a common Turkic identity from an academic platform. Though
the majority of the organization’s early activities were directed towards elite audiences both in
the realms of politics and academia, a number of other activities interfaced more directly with
artists.
One of the more curious priorities of Bülbüloğlu’s tenure was the inauguration of yearly
photography and painting exhibitions beginning in 1998. Both projects were the personal
initiative of Bülbüloğlu, who believed that any respectable international culture organization
ought to host painting and photography exhibitions.17 For both series of exhibitions, a number of
painters and photographers were gathered from across TÜRKSOY’s member states and
commissioned to produce original work under the rubric of a particular theme – typically a
specific location or region. While the photography exhibitions have featured a wide geographic
scope of subject matter, from various locales in Turkey to Central Asia, the painting exhibitions
have always been hosted in Turkey. Every year, between ten and fifteen painters have been
brought from across TÜRKSOY’s member states – sometimes even from minority Turkic
communities in Montenegro, Kosovo, Bosnia or Iraq – to participate in a two week long
16
17

Ibid.
TÜRKSOY Painting Exhibition Catalog, Istanbul 1998.
9

competition. Often held in Western Turkey along the Mediterranean, Aegean or Black Sea coasts
in a rented-out villa, the painters are given two weeks to produce a number of works to be
exhibited, judged and considered for a prize. TÜRKSOY’s painting exhibitions have become a
hallmark of the organization’s yearly cultural events. After sixteen cycles and over a thousand
paintings – all of which belong to TÜRKSOY – the organization has even discussed the
possibility of erecting a museum for Turkic art.18
The first fifteen years of the organization can be characterized by an appeal to high
culture and an awareness of certain universal standards in the domain of international cultural. In
1996, a protocol was signed between TÜRKSOY and UNESCO, outlining the two organizations’
intent to collaborate. While the cooperation between the two existed only nominally throughout
Bülbüloğlu’s directorship, he nonetheless referred to TÜRKSOY as the UNESCO of the Turkic
world. Paralleling the organization’s conception of itself as a localized UNESCO and in line with
Bülbüloğlu’s background as a diplomat, TÜRKSOY’s early activities courted an elite crowd of
politicians, academics and high-profile artists. In the same vein as the photography and painting
exhibitions, a program of “Opera Days” took place annually.19 As was evidenced in Bülbüloğlu’s
comment on the necessity of certain types of events, his criteria for what constituted
“international” culture denoted specific artistic forms – none of which could be said to be
specifically Turkic. With the exception of the organization’s Nevruz celebrations (to be further
elaborated in chapter 2), the Bülbüloğlu years saw little in the way of popular engagement.

Transformations Under Kaseinov

18
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With the end of Polad Bülbüloğlu’s tenure and the accession of Dusen Kaseinov, the
organization entered a period of transformation. As the former Kazakhstani Minister of Culture
and an artist himself, Kaseinov has instituted major changes both in the organization’s
ideological outlook and repertoire of events. While Bülbüloğlu sought internal rapprochement
among member states, in the words of Dr. Purtas, “the fundamental character of [Kaseinov’s]
period has been an effort to acquaint Turkic culture to the world.”20 As the first major step to
raise awareness of Turkic culture beyond the boundaries of the Turkic world, TÜRKSOY
actively built upon the organization’s partnership with UNESCO to host a series of events in
Europe and the US. In 2010, TÜRKSOY staged a large-scale Nevruz performance at UNESCO’s
headquarters in Paris, followed by a series of Nevruz celebrations at major venues in New York,
Boston and Washington D.C. in 2011. Some of the high-profile venues included the UN
headquarters, the New York Town Hall, the Lincoln Theater and Harvard and Georgetown
Universities.21 TÜRKSOY has also established bilateral relations with other like cultural
organizations, such as the European Commission and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference, through which they have held exhibitions and seminars across Europe and the
Islamic world.
The other main aspect of transformation during Kaseinov’s tenure has been relative to the
scale of events. While the first fifteen years of TÜRKSOY’s activities revealed a commitment to
publications and exhibitions, Kaseinov’s period has been characterized by large-scale
productions featuring performance. Examples of these events have been the organization’s
“trademark” Nevruz activities hosted both abroad and in Turkey, but also such large productions
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as the Köroğlu Opera and the Yunus Emre Oratorio. The Köroğlu Opera featured upwards of 200
performers from Turkey, Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Bashkortostan and Tatarstan and
was staged in Istanbul, Ankara, Baku, Bishkek, Almaty and Astana. The Yunus Emre Oratorio
toured the US with an orchestra of over 80 members in a production featuring the poetry of the
13th century Turkish mystic. TÜRKSOY’s International Youth Chamber Orchestra has also
toured the US and Europe. 22 Such large productions have aimed to attract both popular and elite
audiences; domestic as well as international recognition. Most importantly, these new activities
are no longer concerned with proving the existence of a common Turkic identity; rather, they
aim at actively creating it. TÜRKSOY’s focus has shifted from a niche, intellectual domain to
the public realm of participation.
Despite these changes, the organization’s activities have maintained a fair amount of
continuity. The painting and photography exhibitions, as well as the Opera Days have been
maintained as annual traditions. The Nevruz celebrations have remained the same in terms of
content while increasing in terms of scale.23 Sporadic celebrations of important figures of Turkic
history, such as the 70th birthday of Cengiz Aytmatov have been systematized into a calendar of
“memorial years:” 2010 was the year of Zeki Velidi Togan, followed by the year of Abdullah
Tukay in 2011, Mirza Fatali Ahundzade in 2012 and Mukan Tölebayev in 2013. Dr. Purtas has
noted that the institution of “memorial years” has constituted one of the organization’s most
important new projects, alongside the institution of the annually rotating “Cultural Capital of the
Turkic World” (to be elaborated in Chapter 3).24 The inauguration of “memorial years” appears
to have supplanted the organization’s academic publications, which have essentially come to a
22
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halt since Kaseinov’s tenure. In the past five years, TÜRKSOY has largely succeeded in
expanding its repertoire of activities to include all types of artistic media: as the organization has
launched large-scale productions on an unprecedented level, older events have been consolidated
as annual traditions. While Bülbüloğlu stressed the fine arts – specifically painting – as a means
to global recognition, Kaseinov has stressed an all-inclusive approach to culture. This attitude is
evident in his personal rhetoric, as the phrase “diversity and authenticity” is often applied to
TÜRKSOY’s wide array of activities “from painting to music, from theater to cinema, from
architecture to intangible cultural heritage, from literature to fine arts…”25 In line with the notion
of TÜRKSOY as a localized UNESCO, Kaseinov has sought to expand the scope of Turkic
culture to the broadest definition.

A Cultural Agenda?
Frequently and formulaically invoked in the organization’s publications and
presentations, TÜRKSOY’s goals are to build friendly relations between Turkic countries and
peoples, to research, develop and protect Turkic culture, language, history and art to pass on to
future generations and lastly, to acquaint the world with Turkic culture.26 All of these objectives
are set within the context of achieving world peace through cultural understanding.27 Paralleling
TÜRKSOY’s commitment to the ideal of world peace – no doubt appropriated from the model of
UNESCO – the organization appears similarly committed to the realization of Turkic culture
within a “universal scope.”28 This appeal to universal standards of cultural recognition was
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evident in Bülbüloğlu’s commitment to painting and the fine arts and in Kaseinov’s dedication to
“authenticity and diversity” across all cultural mediums.
In an interview with Dr. Purtas, the assistant director maintained that no one cultural form
is privileged above any other within the ideology of the organization. Similarly, no one medium
is more ‘Turkic’ than another – everything contained within the broadest plausible boundaries of
the Turkic world is affirmed as culture.29 Dr. Purtas rightfully stressed the dimension of logistics:
as a kind of sub-UNESCO, TÜRKSOY has the blessing of a reduced bureaucracy, which permits
the facile staging of events. Most importantly, the staging of events is contingent upon the
possibilities at hand and the individuals and organizations that are willing to participate at any
given time. Dr. Purtas framed TÜRKSOY as an all-inclusive platform for cultural agents to gain
broader recognition, particularly within an international (or at least regional) context – a kind of
neutral vehicle of culture. TÜRKSOY asserts neither cultural ideology nor political agenda, and
does not privilege one cultural form above another within an ethnic context. Instead, the
organization maintains its commitment to universal ideals: raising global awareness of culture
and the project of world peace.
While TÜRKSOY’s commitment to such ideals is undoubtedly admirable, the
organization’s pretension to universality and the democracy of cultural forms serves important
political objectives. Foremost among these political achievements is the projection of an
“apolitical” agenda; in other words, because TÜRKSOY claims to function as a neutral, nondiscriminatory vehicle of culture, it cannot have any political objectives of its own. Through the
act of restaging culture that is supposedly pre-existing, TÜRKSOY disavows its own agency in
cultural production. Similarly, the proposition of all-inclusiveness through the equality of

29
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cultural forms serves to erase the different histories each form of culture. Opera, folk dance and
photography become reduced to interchangeable categories of “culture.” Particularly within the
domain of ethnicity, the universalization of culture elides the specific historical contexts that
gave rise to such cultural forms: “high culture” and fine arts become disassociated with their
colonial European roots. Similarly, the complex historiography of Turkic culture is reduced
within its Islamic context, as the interplay between Persian, Arabic and Turkic cultures is elided
in the same way as Europe’s cultural influence. More than anything, this “apolitical” ideology
serves to make culture appear neutral, or simply as a “given” in much the same way that the
ethnically-based nation states of the Turkic world are taken as organic formations. These
questions will be explored in the subsequent chapters.

Chapter 2
‘Nevruz’ and the Staging of Turkic Culture As Universal Heritage
In January of 2013, TÜRKSOY released a special magazine publication on the occasion
of the organization’s 20th anniversary. Detailing the organization’s events held in the past year,
the magazine highlighted TÜRKSOY’s Nevruz celebrations as the most popular of the
organization’s activities. The fact that TÜRKSOY’s Nevruz celebrations were held in such
prestigious venues as the UNESCO headquarters in Paris, the General Assembly Hall of the
United Nations in New York and the Lincoln Center in Washington D.C. was presented as the
main index of success, although the magazine also stressed the prevalence of TÜRKSOY’s
Nevruz activities across 17 different cities within Turkey.30 Accordingly, the cover of the 20th
anniversary magazine featured a woman dressed in elaborate Central Asian folkloristic costume.
She is pictured handing a ceremonial Nevruz tray to Turkish President Abdullah Gül, bearing
30
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painted eggs, wheat sprouts and candles, all wrapped in a red ribbon proclaiming “TÜRKSOY –
2012.” In the words of TÜRKSOY’s assistant director Dr. Firat Purtas, Nevruz has not only
become TÜRKSOY’s “trademark” event31 – mirroring the emblazoned ribbon in the photograph
– but also a tradition exemplifying “the common cultural heritage of humanity” central to
TÜRKSOY’s mission.32
TÜRKSOY’s optimistic proposition of Nevruz as a tradition common to all Turkic
peoples belies the holiday’s nuanced and contested geneaology in recent years. Since the 1980s,
both within Turkey and across the Caucasus and Central Asia, Nevruz has served as a public site
for the contestation of political identities. Within Turkey, Nevruz was politicized as a site of
Kurdish resistance both within the civic sphere. The holiday was seized as an occasion for
popular protest and even terrorism organized by the Kurdish Workers’ Party. Within Azerbaijan
and Central Asia, however, Nevruz emerged as an important symbol of independence from the
Soviet system. As relatively separate and geopolitically independent phenomena, these two
trajectories of Nevruz converged within Turkey following the collapse of the Soviet Union. At
the center of this cultural convergence, TÜRKSOY has played an active role in determining and
propagating a new definition of Nevruz within Turkey and on to global audiences. TÜRKSOY’s
immediate objective has been to reclaim Nevruz from the context of Kurdish resistance; the
implicit result, however, has been to depoliticize Nevruz and to assert the divorce of politics from
culture.

The Case of Turkey: ‘Nevruz’ versus ‘Newroz’

31
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Though publicly celebrated during Ottoman times, Nevruz was absent from the Republic
of Turkey’s official calendar of holidays until 1991.33 Largely associated with the Iranian
diaspora during the Ottoman period and up through the Second World War, in the 1970s the
holiday began to acquire a different connotation within Turkey. With the crystallization of
organized Kurdish resistance to the Turkish state, Nevruz (Newroz in Kurdish) came to
encapsulate a narrative of ethnic resistance mobilized to unite Kurds against their oppressors.
From the narrative of Nevruz [pers. Nowruz] present in the Persian Shahname, the main character
Feridun was replaced in popular Kurdish mythology by the character of Kawa [pers. Kaveh], an
ethnic Kurd who goes on to defeat the oppressive Assyrian King Dahhak and liberating his
people.34 As an anti-hegemonic myth of ethnic resistance, Newroz presented both an ideological
rallying call among Kurdish activists as well as an annual site for political protest during holiday
celebrations.
By the 1980s, Newroz had become broadly associated with Kurdish resistance. In
response, mass Newroz celebrations were outlawed by the Turkish govenrment and state security
forces remained on high alert during the holiday. Paradoxically, around the same time,
government officials decided to institute Nevruz – spelled with a ‘v’ rather than a ‘w’ to conform
to the Turkish rather than Kurdish alphabet – as a state holiday. The institutionalization of
Nevruz as a Turkish holiday constituted an implicit rejection of the way in which it was being
utilized within Kurdish resistance. Interestingly, this official rebuke of Newroz associated with
Kurdish resistance did not explicitly denounce the holiday itself, nor focus solely on the Kurdish
Worker’s Party’s use of terrorism, but rather stressed that the latter group had portrayed Nevruz
33
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incorrectly. By shifting the locus of debate from resistance itself to the site of resistance, Turkish
officials were able to elide the motives for resistance without having to confront them directly.
By maintaining Nevruz as a peaceful, fraternal and tolerant celebration with the capability of
“erasing hatred and animosity,”35 it is my contention that officials attempted to neutralize the
symbolic vehicle of Kurdish dissent within public discourse.
Since the early 1990s, the Turkish government’s interpretation of Nevruz has cast the
holiday as an ancient celebration of nature. This primordialist conception has been maintained
with remarkable consistency by Turkish politicians ever since, and some have even assigned the
holiday an important role in the formation of Turkish nationalism. In the early 1990s, Prime
Minister Süleyman Demirel admitted that ethnic groups within Turkey had a right to retain their
own identity and culture. At the same time, however, Demirel maintained that Nevruz was an
essentially unifying holiday rather than one divided along ethnic grounds. While asserting that
most communities that celebrate Nevruz have Turkish origins, referring to the Turkic peoples
formerly bound within the Soviet Union, Demirel also proposed that “like all traditions, [Nevruz]
has a cohesive nature that looks into the future rather than the past.”36 Postulating that cultural
identity fundamentally exists in the present and is forward-looking, Demirel denied the historical
narrative of political marginalization that has constituted the very premise of Kurdish resistance.
While not explicitly denying Kurds the right to celebrate Nevruz, the government deemed any
reference to the holiday as Newroz as illegal based on the fact that there is no ‘w’ in the Turkish
language, and as an official state holiday it must be spelled as Nevruz.37

35

Ismail Kahraman, Minister of Culture in Sabah, 21 March 1997 in Yanik, "‘Nevruz’or
‘Newroz’?" p.289
36
Milliyet, 21 March 1996 in Ibid, p.288
37
Ibid, p.293
18

This promotion of Nevruz by Turkish political elites coincided with Turkey’s
rapprochement with the Turkic republics of the Caucasus and Central Asia. If anything, the
Central Asian and Azerbaijani practices of Nevruz were imported by Turkish cultural elites as a
more favorable definition of the holiday. This alternative Nevruz gave the Turkish government
an opportunity to redefine the holiday instead of merely suppressing it.

Navro’z in Central Asia
At roughly the same time, Navro’z (Uzbek: Navr’oz, Kazakh: Nauryz) emerged as a locus
of identity politics within the Turkic republics of the Soviet Union during the 1980s. The holiday
had been banned under Soviet authority under the premise of being a religious holiday alongside
the Muslim holidays of Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha. The idea of Navro’z was revisited in the
context of a more ambiguously defined spring holiday during the Gorbachev era.38 While
recognized then as a pre-Islamic holiday with motifs primarily evocative of nature rather than
religious belief, the Soviet engagement with the idea of a spring holiday was both a concession
to the Soviet populations that had celebrated Navro’z, as well as an opportunity for the festivities
to be reframed in terms of agricultural labor along the lines of May Day.39
Throughout the 1980s, the implementation of a Soviet-style spring holiday at the same
time as Navro’z had varying success across the Central Asian republics. In Uzbekistan, a new
holiday called Navbahor (new spring) was introduced as a replacement for the Uzbek Navro’z.
However, the installation of Navbahor coincided with the beginnings of perestroika and
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glasnost, opening up a public forum for debate on the cultural significance of the new Soviet
holiday. On the heels of the notorious “cotton affair,” an incident in which many Uzbek officials
were sacked for corruption for having exaggerated the Uzbek SSR’s cotton export figures,
Navbahor fell on ethnic Uzbeks at a time of national humiliation and resentment towards the
Communist Party. The institutionalization of Navbahor was taken as further insult to the injury
of the cotton scandal by the Uzbeks and consequently never took hold.40
At the same time, however, in Kazakhstan, the introduction of a deliberately vague Soviet
spring holiday proved to be more of a success. The holiday juxtaposed Russian or generally
Slavic pre-Christian figures such as Grandfather Frost (D’ed Moroz) with elements of Central
Asian culture such as the Kazakh batirs or horseback heroes, and even more widespread figures
of Turkic folklore such as Nasreddin Hoja. As a fusion of both Slavic and Turkic cultures, the
holiday even allowed for ethnic intermingling as Kazakhs parodied Russian folk dances. In Hilda
Eitzen’s account, an ethnically Ukrainian Kazakhstani was reported as saying that “Nauryz is a
universal holiday for all of us different nationalities here in Kazakhstan”41 A significant factor in
the delineating Kazakhstani and Uzbekistani reintroductions of Nevruz-like festivals in the 1980s
can likely be attributed to the demographic composition of the two Central Asian republics.
Kazakhstan retained no dominant majority (not even ethnic Kazakhs) throughout the late Soviet
years, but comprised a variety of ethnicities and roughly equal populations of Slavs and Central
Asians.
In the post-independence era, however, Navro’z/Nauryz acquired distinctly ethnic
overtones in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan paralleling the rise of national primordialism. In
Uzbekistan, Navro’z became internalized as a fundamental aspect of Uzbek culture that was
40
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unfairly suppressed during the Soviet period. Nonetheless, as Laura Adams points out, “when
[Uzbek] artists talk about the renaissance of folk culture, they claim that culture was repressed
while at the same time admitting that it has always existed.” This reveals the slippery categories
of “true” culture, as cultural activities referred to as “entertainment” during the Soviet period
become “Uzbekistan’s ancient arts” in the post-Soviet period.42 As Navro’z became a trope of
Uzbek independence, the concept of a primordial Uzbek nationalism was inscribed upon the
tradition of Navro’z. What has certainly changed is the holiday’s official status, as statesponsored Navro’z celebrations reached the caliber of Olyimpics-scale production during the
post-independence period.43
Similarly in Kazakhstan, Nauryz acquired ethnic overtones that differentiated it from the
broader Russian and Slavic elements of the Soviet spring holiday, although without the outright
condemnation of Russian or Soviet culture as in Uzbekistan. Immediately following
independence, Kazakhstan was faced with the problem that Kazakhs constituted a minority of the
country’s population at 40%.44 While Russian was kept as a de facto lingua franca, the postindependence regime implemented Kazakh as the sole official language of the country.
Consequently, the state sought to privilege an ethnic definition of the state without actively
marginalizing its non-titular elements, namely Russians (37%), Ukrainians and Germans. This
privileging of ethno-national identity within Kazakhstan was similarly evident in Nauryz
celebrations. Ethnic Kazakhs adopted an exclusionary stance, claiming that Nauryz derived from
an exclusively Central Asian context, but also intersecting (in an ironic contrast to Uzbekistan)
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with Islamic elements.45 However, whereas Uzbekistani celebrations of Navro’z solely portray
Uzbek ethno-national elements, Nauryz in Kazakhstan is necessarily formulated on Kazakh
culture but critically buttressed with appeals to multiculturalism, as President Nazarbayev
delivers his speeches first in Kazakh and then in Russian.46 Whereas Uzbekistan has done much
to build a national identity based on distinctly Uzbek nationalism, the Kazakhstani government
“focuses on broad models of efficiency and progress that only superficially propagate ethnonational and historical content.”47
In both cases, the spring holiday has been associated with a primordialist commitment to
local sovereignty invested in the titular ethnicities of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The difference
between the two cases remains whether or not this primordial identity implies an ethnically
exclusive cultural policy. In Uzbekistan this is certainly the case, as Navro’z came to symbolize
an anticolonial understanding of the Soviet experience and a subsequent ‘return’ to Uzbek
sovereignty. In Kazakhstan, the prominent Slavic population raised fears of an erosion of Kazakh
ethnic identity within the new state. Concern over ethnic sovereignty peaked during the 1990s as
the government sought to define Kazakhstan as a fundamentally Kazakh state that was
nonetheless interested in retaining multiculturalism. Like Turkey, both of these Central Asian
republics witnessed the framing of Navro’z/Nauryz in inherently primordial terms intertwined
with preexisting concepts of ethnic nationalism. In all of these cases, the state sought to
monopolize the definition of Nevruz/Navro’z/Nauryz. At the same time, the government’s claim
to the holiday also implied its status as a primordial element of the state.
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On an international level, Nevruz is consequently defined as a consensus of national
definitions. A striking example of the contested definition of Nevruz on the international stage
occurred in 1997 in Kazakhstan, when several thousand Kurds took to the streets of Almaty in
protest of the municipality’s decision to revoke permission for a Kurdish Nevruz celebration.
While the reasons for the cancellation were not officially announced, one informant reported that
the event organized by the cultural body representing the 35,000 Kurds in Kazakhstan, known
supporters of the Kurdish Worker’s Party, would have shown an “anti-Turkish character…
infringing on the interests of friendly Turkey.”48 More so than a truly universal concept, then, the
character of Nevruz has been made subordinate to national interests.

TÜRKSOY: Staging the universal
Epitomizing the tension between universal heritage and national identity at work in the
reconceptualization of Nevruz is the process by which TÜRKSOY has pioneered the holiday as
its international ‘trademark.’ TÜRKSOY and its sister organization TIKA (the Turkish
International Cooperation and Development Agency) played a central role in ‘importing’ the
non-Kurdish definition of Nevruz into Turkey in light of the Turkish ‘rediscovery’ of Central
Asia. Both TÜRKSOY and TIKA provided a number of scholarships in the 1990s for Caucasian
and Central Asian students to study in Turkish universities. In turn, TÜRKSOY began to
organize its own Nevruz celebrations to help provide these students with a sense of cultural
familiarity (ironically, this same process of acculturation was simultaneously at work in their
home countries). Nevruz was institutionalized as one of TÜRKSOY’s first annual celebrations.
TÜRKSOY’s staging of Nevruz highlighted the symbolic and folkloric elements of the holiday:
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folk dancing, Central Asian traditional dress and the iconic objects associated with the holiday,
such as painted eggs, candles and bundles of wheat sprouts.
An important shift in the organization of TÜRKSOY – both on the level of activities and
their underpinning ideology – occurred with the appointment of Dusein Kaseinov to the position
of Secretary General in 2008. Though TÜRKSOY had initiated bilateral relations with UNESCO
in the early 1990s, this affiliation remained largely symbolic until Kaseinov’s arrival. The pact of
cooperation was finally substantiated in 2010 when TÜRKSOY organized a large-scale Nevruz
production to be held at the UNESCO headquarters in Paris. Featuring over 100 artists from six
of TÜRKSOY’s constituent members (Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Bashkortostan,
Tatarstan and Turkey), TÜRKSOY went on to organize performances of similar scale to tour the
US the following year. These Nevruz performances, held in such prestigious locations as the UN
Headquarters, Carnegie Hall and the Lincoln Theater in Washington DC, stood at the forefront of
TÜRKSOY’s mission to acquaint the world with Turkic culture.49 Despite the holiday’s arguably
more central role in Persian culture, Nevruz became the primary vehicle by which Turkic culture
achieved international recognition.
Within TÜRKSOY’s globalizing vision, Nevruz has paradoxically become both a
metaphor of primordial Turkic identity and a universal aspect of humanity. While maintaining
that Turkic peoples have celebrated Nevruz for over 5,000 years,50 TÜRKSOY has also
repeatedly invoked the universal character of coming-of-spring celebrations. The juxtaposition of
these two concepts seems to suggest that Nevruz is the Turkic world’s (and consequently
TÜRKSOY’s) contribution to human heritage. This conceptualization of Nevruz thus frames it
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as a dimension of universal culture brought into existence through the primordial sieve of Turkic
culture. This somewhat contradictory notion has been summarized poetically by Dr. Firat Purtas:
“As it is known, since ancient times Turkic people have celebrated [Nevruz] as a symbol of life’s
vibrancy, continuity and colorfulness. In fact, it is man’s inner self that awakens with each spring.
This joyous side of life brought along with it a vast culture of tolerance. This day which has been
treated as a holiday for centuries has become an example of friendship and brotherhood.”

Depoliticization and Exclusion from the Universal
In contrast to TÜRKSOY’s proposition of a universalizing holiday of fraternal,
humanistic solidarity, the organization has reproduced the Turkish government’s exclusionary
rhetoric aimed at silencing Kurdish resistance. In the same vein as Süleyman Demirel and
subsequent heads of state in the 1990s and 2000s, TÜRKSOY has also become a platform for
denouncing the Kurdish ‘politicization’ of Nevruz in the 1980s and 90s. In an interview for
TÜRKSOY’s magazine published in 2012, Ertrugrul Günay, the Turkish Minister of Culture and
Tourism, explained the increasing interest in Nevruz as such:
“Nevruz has been released from the wrong political connotations of subversiveness and is being
rehabilitated. Nevruz means ‘brand new day.’ Nevruz is the awakening of nature. Nevruz is a
common festival of all agrarian societies, communities and nations, which is why the previous
attempts to assimilate Nevruz into a single community’s domination shall be evaluated as an
eclipse of reason. I believe that now we are over these illusions.”51

Günay rightly points out that Nevruz cannot successfully be assimilated into the dominant
hegemony of a single community; rather, Nevruz has been assimilated into a hegemonic coalition
of nations that has worked together to exclude certain voices, such as Turkey’s Kurds. This
consensus that has determined Nevruz an element of universal cultural heritage is formulated
within a constituency of nations. To varying degrees, each of these nations claims that the
holiday stands as an ontological aspect of national consciousness. Peoples without representative
nations, specifically minority communities who refuse the ethno-national premise of sovereignty
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in states such as Turkey, Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan consequently have no right to participate in
this assumption of political identity.
In an interview with Dr. Purtas, he explained the Kurdish co-option of Nevruz as an act
of politicization that changed the true nature of the holiday. He contrasted this ‘politicized’
interpretation of Nevruz with its allegedly correct status as a ‘peoples’ holiday.’ The irony of
TÜRKSOY’s portrayal of the ‘true nature’ of Nevruz as solely a cultural holiday is evident in the
deeply political act of its ‘depoliticization.’ Rather than liberating the holiday from politics,
TÜRKSOY has merely asserted a monopolizing claim to the politics of Nevruz: that the holiday
– at least in Turkey – will remain under the joint proprietorship of a coalition of national interests
under the guise of Turkic fraternity.
More broadly, Nevruz has been a primary site for the divorce of politics from culture.
When asked about the significance of TÜRSOY’s Nevruz being held at a political organization
like the United Nations, Kaseinov responded: “Our activities are not political; rather, they are
humanistic, cultural and artistic. With our celebrations, Turkic culture and fraternity will be
shown to the whole world.” 52 By appealing to the universally positive qualities of humanity,
culture and art, Kaseinov preempted a discussion of politics. Through the deeply political act of
monopolizing the holiday’s meaning, TÜRKSOY has claimed the apolitical nature of the holiday.

Chapter 3
Nation Building: Astana as Cultural Capital of the Turkic World
In 2012, TÜRKSOY declared Astana as the first annually rotating Cultural Capital of the
Turkic World. Astana’s tenure as Capital featured numerous events organized between
52
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TÜRKSOY, the Astana Municipality and various local foundations and government agencies. A
number of conferences and gatherings throughout the year were bookended by opening and
closing ceremonies featuring popular and folk songs and dances. Dr. Firat Purtas, Assistant
Director of TÜRKSOY, identified the idea of a Capital of Turkic Culture as one of the
organization’s most important new initiatives moving forward and defining projects realized
under Dusen Kaseinov’s leadership.53
The impact of TÜRKSOY’s declaration of Astana as Capital of Turkic Culture for 2012
was twofold: on one hand, TÜRKSOY garnered the financial and institutional support of the city
to host a high concentration of events, thus raising the organization’s profile within Kazakhstan.
On the other hand, TÜRKSOY contributed to the greater project of Astana – the focal point of
President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s national “image project”54 – by staging a program of cultural
events underscoring Astana’s international centrality in the realm of culture. Astana presently
stands at the forefront of Nazarbayev’s campaign to establish a positive image for Kazakhstan.
Under the telos of economic development, Nazarbayev has channeled immense resources into
the creation of a city corresponding to his vision of Kazakhstan’s future. Moreover, as political
vision-turned-urban environment, Kazakhstanis are called upon to participate in Nazarbayev’s
grand vision of Astana as workers, consumers and inhabitants of the city. Through its hypermodern appearance and symbolic geography of monuments, sports arenas, education facilities
and government buildings, the city also seeks to communicate Kazakhstan’s prominence on the
world stage.
While Nazarbayev has employed an internationally recognized cadre of architects to
validate Astana’s claim to global modernity, the project of Kazakhstani nation building is
53
54

Author’s interview with Firat Purtas, January 8, 2013
Koch, The City and the Steppe, p.2
27

simultaneously dependent on the notion of Kazakh tradition and ethnic particularity. TÜRKSOY
has provided an avenue for Astana’s international recognition on the grounds of a shared Turkic
past rather than an imagined modernist future. The role of the past is critical in Nazarbayev’s
conception of a particular “Kazakhstani way,” or a uniquely Kazakh avenue towards national
development.55 Nazarbayev’s insistence on the particularity of the Kazakhstani nation-building
project serves two goals: to counter foreign teleologies of development, whether Soviet or
neoliberal, while simultaneously consolidating Nazarbayev’s singular authority as the national
leader. Moreover, while TÜRKSOY’s recognition of Astana as the Cultural Capital of the Turkic
World sought to establish the centrality of Astana beyond the borders of Kazakhstan, it implicitly
validated Nazarbayev’s conception of Kazakh culture. As a dually modernist and traditionalist
project, Astana stands for a uniquely Turkic teleology fusing primordialism with the promise of a
bright, national future.

Capital of Culture: a Globalizing Template
The model of an annually rotating “Capital of Culture” was first implemented by the
European Council in 1985. The idea was coined between the Ministers of Culture of France and
Greece, Jack Lang and Melina Mercouri, who named Athens as the first European Capital of
Culture. To strengthen Europe’s regional identity, the initiative was proposed primarily as a
means to cultural integration. The selection of Athens as the first Capital of Culture also marked
a kind of civilizational overtone within the project. Each year, a different city would come into
the spotlight as the placeholder for the region’s cultural image – a democratic model aimed at
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fostering common identification while also promoting infrastructural investment.56 More
critically, the Capital of Culture aimed to foster a regional sense of shared propriety. In the words
of José Barroso, President of the European Commission,
“… the Capitals have always been an opportunity for Europeans to meet, to learn about their
diversity, but at the same time to enjoy together their common history and values, to cooperate in
new initiatives and projects: in other words, to experience the feeling of belonging to the same
European community.” 57

Barroso highlights a central aspect of the “Capital of Culture” paradigm: citizens of a region are
taught to identify with culture at the level of region rather than nation. Only one (although later,
up to two or three) of Europe’s cities is selected to receive an entire region’s economic and
cultural capital. In a process of synecdoche, the façade of the city becomes the face of the region,
giving substance to an abstract idea of “Europe.” This mode of integration is both economic and
symbolic, as capital flows to the Capital, while the Capital itself becomes a symbol of regional
identity. This formulation of regional identity appears inclusive, democratic and developmentoriented through the process of annual rotation. Above all, the idea of a “Capital of Culture” was
intended to breathe life into a bureaucratic entity and to foster, as it were, a regional identity to
transcend national identities.
Following its success in Europe, the “Capital of Culture” model was adopted by a
number of regional entities outside of Europe. The Arab League implemented its own Arab
Capital of Culture in 1996, while the Organization of American States has sponsored the
American Capital of Culture since 2000. TÜRKSOY’s own Cultural Capital of the Turkic World
was first declared in Astana in 2012, while 2013 will belong to the city of Eskisehir in Turkey
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and 2014 to Kazan. In each regional instantiation of “Cultural Capitals,” the program bore a dual
identity: regional in content, globalized in form. In the same vein of TÜRKSOY’s selfidentification as a localized UNESCO, the organization conceived of its Cultural Capital of the
Turkic World project in the same language as the European Council.58 By identifying with a
European precedent, TÜRKSOY not only sought to validate its specific program of events, but to
equate a Turkic regional identity on par with that of Europe – at least in the realm of culture.

The Project of Astana
According to Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, “Astana is a city-sign, a
sign of dreams, incarnated in reality… the pride and heart of Kazakhstan.”59 Astana stands as the
flagship of President Nazarbayev’s vision for national development. In power since the collapse
of the Soviet Union, Nazarbayev has maintained power through a patrimonial style of
government sometimes referred to as a “teleocracy” – in other words, a system of government
legitimated by the regime’s promise and achievement of a set agenda for development.60
Through Soviet-style five-year plans for economic progress, each situated within the master plan
of “Kazakhstan 2030,” Nazarbayev seeks to monopolize discourse on the trajectory of the state.
By and large, Nazarbayev’s style of government has succeeded: as he remains firmly entrenched
in all aspects of Kazakhstani politics, the country has also prospered economically under his
reign as president.61
Probably the single most monumental step in Nazarbayev’s program of development was
the decision to relocate the capital of independent Kazakhstan from Almaty to Aqmola, later to
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be renamed Astana. The move was announced in 1994 and realized in 1997. Since the capital’s
relocation and renaming – from Aqmola (“white mausoleum”) to Astana (simply “capital” in
Kazakh) – the city has been the site of a massive building project under the direct supervision of
the government.62 While Almaty had served as Kazakhstan’s main urban center since Russian
colonization of the steppe in the 19th century, Astana constituted a material incarnation of the
new, post-independence nation-building project and a tabula rasa for the legacy of the
Nazarbayev regime. Both physically and symbolically, Astana has become the centerpiece of the
Nazarbayev’s Kazakhstan.
Astana is also the privileged site of Nazarbayev’s national vision of progress. Though
Almaty remains Kazakhstan’s largest city and the main urban hub of southern Kazakhstan,
Nazarbayev has maintained that those who wish to live in the past should stay in Almaty –
Astana, conversely, represents the future.63 Realistically, the shift of the nation’s capital has
meant a major reorientation of economic capital. Following the relocation of all government
officials from Almaty to Astana, both the construction and service industries of the new capital
have exploded to accommodate the influx of government personnel. Simply the building of
Astana has constituted a massive enterprise worth tens of billions of dollars. The city’s futuristic
skyline of glittering skyscrapers, government buildings, sports arenas and shopping malls is
portrayed as an indicator of national economic success. As the government reaps the profit of
vast oil and gas reserves through state-owned companies, Nazarbayev maintains that wealth will
be distributed through a trickle-down paradigm centered on the physical construction of the city.
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The appeal of economic prosperity has led the population of Astana to triple in the first ten years,
luring Kazakhstanis from rural and smaller towns to the capital.64
In the same way that the model of a “Cultural Capital” symbolically stands as a
representation of regional identity, official discourse casts the development of Astana as
synecdoche for the development of Kazakhstan as a whole. The creation of jobs in Astana was
meant to imply the creation of jobs across Kazakhstan; images of Astana’s futuristic cityscape
were circulated widely as national images. 65 However, the official image of the city remains
only partially representative. Astana functions not so much as a utopia, but rather as a
heterotopia in Foucault’s terms: a city that is divided powerfully along socioeconomic lines, with
a clear spatial delineation between the pristinely utopic government district and the middle- and
lower-class sections of the city.66 Outside of the new government district, much of the city’s
infrastructure remains from the Soviet period. More dilapidated yet, the rapid influx of job
seekers has led to the formation of shantytowns, sometimes tucked away behind showcase
architectural monuments.67 The centerpiece of Astana, its government district known
colloquially as the “Left Bank” after its location on the previously undeveloped side of the Ishim
River stands in harsh juxtaposition to the socio-economic reality experienced by the majority of
the city’s residents.
As Mateusz Laszczkowski has poignantly argued, the juxtaposition of the utopic and the
outdated or dilapidated parts of the city powerfully serves the narrative of development.
Polarizing the ultramodern and the sub-standard, the two halves of Astana create a spatialization
of progress: traveling from the poorer neighborhoods to the Left Bank, one literally experiences
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a change in temporality from the old to the new. While the masses inhabit the underdeveloped
parts of the city, the elites and government occupy the epicenter of progress, symbolically
locating the state at the vanguard of the national project. Furthermore, the materiality of the Left
Bank is levied as evidence of the feasibility of Nazarbayev’s vision: because it stands as glass
and concrete, the future is a reality incarnate in the present. Nazarbayev’s Left Bank –
meticulously designed and laid out on a monumental, axial grid – stands within reach of the
population of Astana as a tangible instantiation of national progress.68
It is precisely the disparity between Astana’s projected utopia and lower-class reality that
makes Nazarbayev’s program of development promising: the difference between the two
indicates a tangible (spatialized) trajectory of progress. Moreover, all residents and visitors to
Astana are called upon to participate in the futuristic geography of the city. Shopping malls,
sports arenas and the iconic Bayterek observation tower are designed as the premier loci of
public space with the express purpose to engage the populace. These structures constitute a kind
of materialized urban script in which citizens participate and act out Nazarbayev’s vision of the
city as consumers, spectators, inhabitants and visitors. While Nazarbayev and his bureau of city
planners have carefully guided Astana’s development, the appearance of the city’s monuments
are also depicted as striving towards international aesthetics and standards. Much in the same
way that Nazarbayev maintains power by articulating a vision of development for the
Kazakhstani citizenry to fulfill, progress is also framed as a collective effort to achieve
recognition on an international scale.
In a bid to situate Kazakhstan on an international map of culture, world-renowned
architects have been commissioned to design a number of the city’s iconic structures. Kisho
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Kurokawa, famous Japanese architect and pioneer of the Metabolism movement submitted the
winning design for the city’s conceptual layout and designed the Astana airport. A concert hall
was designed by Italian architect Manfredi Nicoletti. Meanwhile, Norman Foster has been
behind the design of two of the city’s most iconic structures: the pyramid-like Palace of Peace
and Reconciliation and the recently completed Khan Shatyr shopping complex. The
commissioning and publicizing of architectural projects by high profile, internationally
recognized firms is aimed at putting Astana on a global map of culture. In light of this objective,
local architects are nominally sidelined while international profiles are given precedence. In
many ways, the high importance accorded to international architects justifies the massive
expenditure on the monuments they help to create.69
Architectural prestige aside, Astana’s landmark structures are themselves oriented
towards an international functionality. A number of venues, from conference centers and
sporting arenas to music halls and shopping malls are designed to accommodate events of
regional and even international profile. The Palace of Peace and Reconciliation, one of the city’s
most striking monuments, was conceptualized to house the Congress of Leaders of World and
Traditional Religions.70 The congress has been hosted four times in Astana and has been cast as
the Nazarbayev regime’s flagship project in international diplomacy. Meanwhile, the pyramid
also houses the 1,500-seat opera hall in which TÜRKSOY held the opening and closing
festivities for the Astana’s tenure as Cultural Capital of the Turkic World. The unveiling of the
Khan Shatyr – a six-story shopping mall with an indoor gulf course and water park built in the
form of a giant tent – was attended by the heads of state of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey, Belarus,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Abu Dhabi and Jordan on the occasion of Nazarbayev’s 70th
69
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birthday.71 The Republican Velodrome, the Astana Arena (Football) and the Astana Ice-Skate
Center were designed to accommodate an international spectatorship for the occasion of the 7th
Winter Asian Games held in 2011.72 The spectacle of these monuments is two-fold: first, their
physicality creates a spectacular environment decisively separated from the everyday quarters of
the city. Secondly, the structures themselves are categorized by the spectacular events which
they are meant to house – as such, the Republican Velodrome becomes the symbol of
Kazakhstani cycling, while the Palace of Peace and Reconciliation marks Astana’s unique role in
the promotion of international peace.
Broadly, the project of Astana aims to monopolize the discourse of national progress
across multiple domains. The new highrise apartments in the central districts of the city and the
magnificent Khan Shatyr shopping mall purport to facilitate a consumerist lifestyle of
international standards. The Palace of Peace and Accord, the newly inaugurated Nazarbayev
University and other performing arts and education centers epitomize the highest achievements
of Kazakhstani citizens in the domains of arts and culture. Ultramodern sporting facilities locate
Kazakhstan on a global map of athleticism. While the sum of Astana’s monuments undoubtedly
conveys a sense of achievement and the realization of human and cultural capital, the entire
construction project remains profoundly didactic. Citizens are instructed how to interact within
the environment of Astana, and more broadly how to live the correct lifestyle; since
Nazarbayev’s vision is embodied in the physicality of the city, Astana offers no alternative telos.
Independent of the final outcome, the process of constructing Nazarbayev’s vision is precisely
the means in which power is enacted: whether or not Astana achieves Nazarbayev’s goal as
71
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“becoming one of the largest megalopolises of Eurasia,”73 Nazarbayev and his elite cadre of
politicians, architects and international collaborators such as Norman Foster and Sembol
construction will have made immense profits. In the way that Nazarbayev seeks to monopolize
the discourse of development, so does the urban fabric of Astana seek to dominate national
symbolism and meaning through a participatory reality.

A Turkic Capital?
While Astana’s bid for international recognition is evident on many levels, the city’s
claim to Turkic culture is both more nuanced and less overt. Since national independence, the
question of ethnicity has constituted a locus of anxieties over the future of the state. At the heart
of the dilemma are two oppositional definitions of Kazakhstani nationalism – one ethnic, the
other civic. The Nazarbayev regime has toed the line between the two, verbally maintaining its
commitment to a multiethnic state founded on internationalism while in reality implementing
measures that favor the titular entitlement of ethnic Kazakhs.74
In the years leading up to Kazakhstan’s independence, the republic contained one of the
most diverse arrays of ethnicities across the entire Soviet Union. In 1989, ethnic Kazakhs
constituted 40% of the population, while Russians represented 38%, Ukrainians 5.5% and
Germans 6% of the Kazakh SSR. Following independence, by 1999 the percentage of Kazakhs
had risen to 53%, while the Russian population diminished to 30% and the German and
Ukrainian contingents decreased by half. By 2009, Kazakhs represented 63% of the republic,
while the Russian population continued to sink to 24% and the Ukrainian and German
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populations dwindled to a mere 2% and 1% respectively.75 While European steadily migrated out
of Kazakhstan in years since independence, the much smaller communities of Turkic and Central
Asian ethnicities have grown overall. These demographic trends have largely coincided with the
so-called Kazakhification of the state, although outmigration of Russians has been a steady factor
since 1975.76
At the moment of Kazakhstan’s independence, the republic’s large Russian component
nevertheless presented a dilemma: would Kazakhstan retain both Russian and Kazakh as official
languages, as during the Soviet period? On one hand, preferential treatment of Kazakh risked
alienating the sizeable Russian minority and relations with Russia. Conversely, eighty years of
Russification had already done considerable damages to the linguistic integrity of Kazakhstan’s
titular ethnicity, as many ethnic Kazakhs were raised with no knowledge of the Kazakh language
during the Soviet period.77 Several arguments came out in support of Kazakh as the sole
language of post-independence Kazakhstan: namely that ethnic Kazakhs were entitled to
Kazakhstan in the same way that Russians were entitled to Russia and that Kazakhstan must be
restored as the primordial homeland of the Kazakhs.78 Ironically, these claims merely restaged
the Leninist concept of a total correspondence between language, nation and territory, albeit in
nativist terms. More realistically, the proposition of two official languages could have led to the
possibility of two states, as northern Kazakhstan posed the danger of separatism by virtue of its
ethnically Russian majority.79
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The privileged location occupied by Russian in Kazakhstan – both as a language and an
ethnic identity – was finally subverted in 1993 by the constitution’s enshrinement of Kazakh as
the sole official language alongside the concept of the ‘self-determination of the Kazakh
nation.’80 Nonetheless, Russian has continued to maintain its status as a de facto lingua franca
and President Nazarbayev typically delivers his speeches first in Kazakh and then in Russian.
The real impact of language reform has been in the realm of government. The official policy that
mandates proficiency in Kazakh among government employees effectively discourages Russians
from entering civil service. In the context of Nazarbayev’s patrimonial state, isolation from the
government often means exclusion from power, hence knowledge of Kazakh privileges a native
state structure. The extension of national entitlement to ethnic Kazakhs through the state’s
official language is also mirrored in the move to Astana; many Kazakhs nationalists and
foreigners alike suspect the real motive behind the capital’s relocation was to effectively
“colonize” the Russian north.81
Nonetheless, the concept of internationalism and ethnic cosmopolitanism has retained its
important status in post-independence Kazakhstan. Official discourse surrounding Astana is
latent with Nazarbayev’s vision of Kazakhstani “Eurasianism.” As a concept, Eurasianism posits
Kazakhstan as a naturally diverse, multi-ethnic (and consequently international) polity, due in
part to its geographic centrality within the expansive continent of Eurasia. Eurasianism paints
Kazakhstan as a crossroads – a meeting point between many different cultures.82 This ideology
serves two goals central to overcoming international and national challenges: on one hand,
Eurasianism accomodates the state’s active integration within a global capitalist market aimed to
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push Kazakhstan towards the center of the global stage; secondly, Eurasianism neutralizes
tensions between both Russian and Kazakh, European and Central Asian identities, situating
each at home within an ambiguous cultural geography of “Eurasia.” Nazarbayev’s Eurasianism
also stresses the civic basis of the state over the ethnic, favoring a Kazakhstani identity over a
Kazakh one.83
The masking of Kazakh primordialism beneath the veneer of “internationalism” or
“Eurasianism” is reflected in a number of Astana’s monuments. These iconic structures bear
symbolic reference to Kazakh culture yet remain concealed beneath abstract architectural forms.
The Khan Shatyr constitutes an architectural monument of international caliber and a world-class
shopping center, while simultaneously bearing reference to the tent culture of Kazakh nomads. A
similar allusion to Kazakh nomadism is contained in the Ak Orda, or presidential palace: an
interior reception room within the four-story neoclassical structure is styled in the form of a giant
yurt.84 The Ak Orda itself is a synthesis of globalizing and particularizing styles: contrasting the
neoclassical façade, the building’s massive blue dome displays Kazakhstan’s national colors. At
the same time, the dome also embodies Nazarbayev’s conception of a national architectural
idiom. In Nazarbayev’s words:
“The dome is the reflection of the national feature in architecture. It goes without saying that a
shape of a dome resembles the shape of the top of the Kazakh yurt. Thus, while keeping to the
traditional we at the same time embrace all that is new and modern. This is the unique feature of
this city.”85

Nazarbayev’s statement is somewhat striking, not in the least because he suggests that the shape
of a dome (as universal an architectural feature as any) should naturally be read as a Kazakh
symbol. Though Nazarbayev maintains the dome as a Kazakh symbol because of its likeness to a
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yurt, a more evident analogy might extend to the turquoise dome of the Mausoleum of Ahmad
Yasavi, a UNESCO site in southern Kazakhstan. Nazarbayev’s concept of a national
architectural idiom clearly privileges a traditional, popular and even folkloristic symbolism to
communicate Kazakh identity. At the same time, implicit meaning is obscured behind a postmodern aesthetic of abstracted shapes.
A similar juxtaposition of implicitly ethnic symbolism and explicitly ‘modern’ aesthetic
is present in the Bayterek, the city’s most iconic architectural symbol. The structure is a 97-meter
tall tower, composed of a white shaft topped with a massive golden sphere. Visitors can ride to
the top of the tower and take in a panorama of the city from the golden globe of tinted glass. The
tower’s shaft and the golden sphere represent a poplar (bayterek in Kazakh), or the Tree of Life
and the egg of the Samruk (pers. Simurgh), a mythical bird of Turco-Persian legend. The
structure is conceived to symbolize a new age of the Kazakh nation, growing from the soil of
history towards a bright future represented by the egg. In the words of Nazarbayev, “the
monument’s architecture reflects the seamless integration of the Kazakh peoples’ spiritual
culture with today’s technology.” 86 Formally, the modern design of the Bayterek betrays nothing
of its mythical connotations. Nonetheless, the reading of the Bayterek as a symbol of particularly
Kazakh Turkic culture exists within Nazarbayev’s vision and the local imagination.87 Much like
the implicit entitlement of ethnic Kazakhs within the governmental structure of postindependence Kazakhstan, the architectural symbolism of Astana masks a tone of cultural
primordialism beneath its modern architectural style. Thus, much of Astana’s aesthetic
communicates a dual orientation, simultaneously embracing a global, contemporary aesthetic
86
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while remaining implicitly rooted in a particular ethno-national context. Past and future are
intermeshed in Nazarbayev’s ideology of Astana:
“The history of Astana and the Kazakhstani’s destiny are inseparable from each other. The capital
embodies power, dynamical development and stability of our country. Astana has become a
bright, strong, prospering city that unites all Kazakhstanis and aspires to the future. Our capital is
the heart of our motherland, the symbol of people’s belief in its power and great mission.”88

The Staging of Turkic Culture
The designation of Cultural Capital undoubtedly located Astana as a central node within
TÜRKSOY’s symbolic geography, while also alluding to Astana’s ethnic identity. Moreover,
TÜRKSOY’s nomination revealed Astana and Kazakhstan’s location relative to other Turkic
polities. As is evident throughout the majority of TÜRKSOY’s major events, the activities
featured Turkey and Kazakhstan as the two major players. The existence of strong cultural ties
between the two countries mirrors an important economic relationship as well. Turkish
companies have had a large hand in the physical construction of Astana: the Turkish Sembol
Construction stands as one of the two main clients of the Kazakhstani government and has
carried out construction of some of the city’s iconic monuments, among them the works of
Norman Foster. As Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated during a diplomatic
visit to Kazakhstan in the context of the 2012 capital of Turkic culture:
“There is no doubt about the fact that the declaration of Astana as the capital of the Turkic World
2012 is a source of pride for us all. Turkish companies have also strongly contributed to the
development of the city of Astana, which stands for the rapid advancement of Kazakhstan. I
personally am proud of this”89

Erdogan’s statement underscores the notion of fraternity between nations central to TÜRKSOY’s
mission, but also Turkey’s investment in Kazakhstan’s nation-building project.
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Though the festivities of the yearlong program highlighted the close relationship between
Turkey and Kazakhstan, a nod to the “diversity and authenticity” of the Turkic world was made
in both the opening and closing ceremonies. Both spectacles featured a huge cast of musicians,
dancers and singers from across the Turkic world brought together on the stage of the Palace of
Peace and Reconciliation. The opening ceremony contained performances by Kazakh, Turkish,
Azeri, Kyrgyz, Volga Tatar, Bashkort, Khakass, Altai, Tuvan, Gagauz, Northern Cypriot and
Crimean Tatar artists, spanning the genres of folk and pop music.90 At one point in the spectacle,
a line of singers in various styles of traditional dress sang the names of various Turkic “tribes,”
from Turkmen, Tatars, Uighur to Karakalpak, Uzbek and Kazakhs comprising the vast
geography over which Astana stood as capital.91 While merely symbolic, this performance on
stage evidenced TÜRKSOY’s conceptualization of the Turkic world as a fraternity of tribes –
some with corresponding nation-states, and some without.
While Astana was designated Culture Capital of the Turkic World, this did not mean an
erosion of the national or inter-ethnic divides comprised within TÜRKSOY; rather, the spectacle
attested to the diversity and distinctiveness of ethnic nationalities. If Astana’s hypermodern
landscape of monuments points forward towards the bright future of Kazakhstan’s development,
the city’s designation as Cultural Capital of the Turkic World pointed backwards to an equally
glorified, mythical past. Just as Nazarbayev maintains a traditional interpretation of modernity,
inscribing a primordial Kazakh mythology onto symbols of national progress such as the
Bayterek, Kazakhstan and TÜRKSOY stand by a modern interpretation of tradition by
maintaining the ethno-national groupings of Turkic peoples. Paralleling Nazarbayev’s
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unwavering commitment to the teleology of economic development, Kazakhstan’s commitment
to a primordial past is similarly portrayed as an irrefutable fact in official discourse.

Conclusion
Although this paper has only been a cursory exploration of TÜRKSOY’s truly vast
repertoire of cultural events, it has been my intent to highlight the most persuasive cases of what
the organization really does. Culture does not exist outside of politics, and even TÜRKSOY’s
proclamation of non-ideology vis-à-vis cultural content and form is in itself a powerful ideology.
Most of all, culture can never be beyond the realm of human interactions and sovereignty,
because even the most ancient of cultural traditions is given new life and power with each reinstantiation. As TÜRKSOY stages its activities, the meaning of tradition is inevitably
reinterpreted and reenacted as it is restaged over and over again, sometimes by new performers
and sometimes in front of new audiences.
As Ronald Suny argues in the case of Armenian and Kazakh nationalism, a primordial
conception of ethno-nationalism serves to legitimate its very existence: political communion
under the rubric of ethnicity constitutes a telos in itself. The insistence on the primordial, ancient
foundations of the modern nation-state stand in contrast to its status as a relatively recent
phenomenon.92 While TÜRKSOY concedes political sovereignty to the paradigm of the
ethnically based nation-state, the legitimation of its philosophy still rests in the present-day
reiteration of a shared, primordial culture. On a pragmatic level, this notion of ontological
likeness at the level of the nation-state is the premise for a special kind of diplomacy. As we
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have seen in the case of Astana, this idea allows for the external validation of the nation-building
project. On an ideological level, this implies a kind of spiritual interconnectedness between
fraternal nations. The particularities of the shared past provide a counter-balance to the
homogenizing global modernity inherent both in Soviet and neoliberal ideologies. Most
importantly, the cultural notion of primordialism affirms the status quo. This is evident in the
notion of ethnic sovereignty in Kazakhstan and Turkey as Russians and Kurds are excluded from
entitlement to the state. Most importantly, the primordialist understanding insists on the
tautology of culture being what culture is, and nothing else. In the context of Nazarbayev’s
regime, this facilitates the state’s monopoly on culture and consequently development. More
broadly, the understanding of culture as an intrinsic fact removes it from the domain of inquiry
and into a didactic, participatory reality.
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